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Note
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Title VII
Shifting Burden Stays Put
[T]he question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is
both sensitive and difficult. The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect an
important national policy. There will seldom be 'eyewitness'
testimony as to the employer's mental processes. But none of
this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat
discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits
employers from discriminating against any individual on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex or national origin."2 Since the passage of
Title VII, courts have struggled to develop judicial standards by which
to evaluate allegations of intentional employment discrimination. In
1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,3 the Supreme Court
established the order and allocation of proof for Title VII intentional
employment discrimination cases.4
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, once the plaintiff
employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant employer assumes a burden of introducing evidence of some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
practice. 5 If the defendant introduces such evidence, the plaintiff must
then prove that the defendant's proffered reason is merely a "pretext "6
I. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2756 (1993) (quoting United
States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)).
3. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See infra notes 33-59 and accompanying text.
4. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800. The Court also refers to these cases as
disparate treatment cases. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981).
5. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Although the Court described the
defendant's burden as a burden of proof, the Court would later hold that the defendant's
burden is one of production. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
6. In the context of Title VII intentional employment discrimination cases, "pretext"
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for discrimination.7
Application of the McDonnell Douglas framework led to confusion
in the lower courts. Consequently, in 19818 and again in 1983, 9 the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the nature of the defendant's burden in Title VII intentional employment discrimination cases. Despite
the Court's efforts, a split in the circuits developed over the following
issue: Whether a plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if
the trier of fact rejects as false the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.' ° Attempting to
resolve this split, the Supreme Court held in St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks" that a plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
even if the trier of fact rejects the employer's reasons as a mere pretext.12 Rather, the plaintiff must prove that the employer intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff. 3
This Note critically analyzes the St. Mary's decision. The Note first
outlines the legislative history of Title VII."4 It then reviews the shifting burden framework the Supreme Court established in McDonnell
Douglas and the Court's subsequent attempts to clarify that framework. 5 Next, the Note examines the split which developed in the
federal circuits over the application of the McDonnell Douglas framework 6 and the role in Title VII cases of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, the rule that governs presumptions in federal civil proceedings. 7 It then discusses the facts and opinions in St. Mary's, 8

means a pretext for intentional discrimination. As one court explained, "[iut is easy to
confuse 'pretext for discrimination' with 'pretext' in the more common sense (meaning
any fabricated explanation for an action)." Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823,
828 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th
Cir. 1987)). A legal dictionary defines "pretext" as an "[o]stensible reason or motive
assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real reason or motive." BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 1187 (6th ed. 1990).
7. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.
8. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 249-50 (1981).
9. See United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 71415 (1983).
10. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2750 (1993) (listing decisions showing the contrary positions of the federal circuit courts).
11. Id. at 2742.
12. Id. at 2749.
13. Id.
14. See infra part II.A.
15. See infra part II.B.
16. See infra part II.C.
17. See infra part lI.D.
18. See infra part III.
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and analyzes the St. Mary's decision' 9 and its probable impact. 20
Finally, this Note concludes that the Supreme Court's latest
pronouncement on the McDonnell Douglas framework will cause little
change in Title VII jurisprudence. 2'
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The cause of action in St. Mary's was created by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ("Civil Rights Act" or "the Act"). 22 The Civil Rights Act
was conceived to protect the civil rights of citizens and to provide relief
when they are violated.23 Congress passed the Act primarily out of
concern over race-based discrimination.24 During the drafting of the
Act, the House Judiciary Committee noted that although a number of
constitutional provisions guarantee equal treatment for all citizens, true
equality was far from being realized.25 Consequently, Congress
enacted legislation to address what it considered the most troublesome
areas, one of which was employment discrimination.26
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to intentionally discriminate on the basis
of "race, color, religion, sex or national origin., 27 Congress created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to eliminate unlawful employment practices through informal and formal
means. 28 Congress vested the Commission with primary responsibil19. See infra part IV.
20. See infra part V.
21. See infra part VI.
22. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
23. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391, 2391.
24. Id. at 2393.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2393-94.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
28. H.R. REP. No. 914, reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2403-05.
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ity for preventing and eliminating employment practices that violate
Title VII. 29
Although Title VII was meant to eradicate discriminatory employment practices, it did not provide the EEOC or the courts with standards for evaluating and adjudicating allegedly discriminatory
practices. 30 This lack of guidance caused members of the House
Judiciary Committee minority to warn that if Title VII were enacted,
employers charged with discrimination would bear the burden of
demonstrating that they did not intentionally discriminate against plaintiff employees. 3 The minority members interpreted Title VII as
requiring employers to actually prove their innocence.
B. The Shifting Burden: The Supreme Court Attempts
to Determine Who Must Prove What

Apparently confirming the fears of the committee minority, in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green33 the Supreme Court adopted a

shifting burden framework for intentional employment discrimination
cases that seemed to impose upon Title VII defendants the burden of
justifying their employment practices. 34 However, since McDonnell
Douglas, the Court has consistently refused to require the employer to
ultimately prove its innocence, holding instead that the plaintiff bears
the ultimate burden of proving that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.35 What remained unclear from McDonnell
29. Id. at 2404.
30. H.R. REP. No. 914 (separate minority views of Congressmen Poff & Cramer),
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462, 2477.
3 1. Id. The two representatives noted that:
At the "trial," the Commission presents whatever evidence it has compiled
concerning racial disparity. At that point, the employer who has been charged
with committing any "unlawful employment practice" must assume the burden
of producing evidence to show, either that the conduct complained of did not,
in fact, constitute discrimination, or that he did not intend by such conduct to
discriminate against the complainant on account of his race. In a word, it
becomes the burden of the employer to prove his own innocence.
Id.
32. Id.
33. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
34. Compare supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text (discussing the House
Judiciary Committee minority's fears) with infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text
(discussing the McDonnell Douglas framework).
35. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2749; see also Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (stating that the
ultimate factual question is whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional discrimination); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)
(remaining "confident that the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination").
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Douglas and its progeny, however, was precisely how the plaintiff
could meet his or her ultimate burden of persuasion.36
The McDonnell Douglas Court held that once a Title VII plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, the
employer assumes a burden to proffer a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for the adverse employment action.37 If the employer meets
that burden, the plaintiff is then allowed an opportunity to establish
that the employer's proffered reason was a mere pretext for discrimination.38 In creating this burden shifting framework, the McDonnell
Douglas Court stated that the burden assumed by the defendant upon
establishment of the plaintiffs prima facie case was a "burden of
proof."39 The Court later interpreted the defendant's burden as a burden of production. 4°
In McDonnell Douglas, Percy Green, an African-American, was
laid off by McDonnell Douglas as part of a general work-force
reduction.4' .Green, who was an activist in the civil rights movement,
believed the lay-off was racially motivated. 42 To protest the lay-off,
Green and other civil rights activists stalled their cars on the main
roads to a McDonnell Douglas plant, intentionally hampering the
morning shift change. 43 Further, approximately one year later, Green
allegedly participated in a "lock-in," during which he and other
activists purportedly chained and padlocked the front door of a
McDonnell Douglas building in downtown St. Louis to prevent
employees from leaving."a
Shortly after the lock-in, McDonnell Douglas advertised for
employees in Green's trade, and Green applied for re-employment.45
McDonnell Douglas rejected Green's application, asserting that it did

3 6. See infra part II.C.
37. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
3 8. Id. at 804.
39. See id. at 802-03. It is this point that led the Court to revisit this issue on
numerous occasions over the past twenty years.
40. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. In Burdine, the Court, citing FED. R. EVID. 301,
clearly set forth the nature of the shifting burden. Id. at 255 n.8; see infra notes 60-67
and accompanying text; see also infra part II.D. (discussing FED. R. EvID. 301).
41. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 794.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 794-95.
44. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 795. Although the circuit court had found that
the record did not support a conclusion that Green had actively participated in the lockin, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach that issue after concluding that Green
had actively participated in the stall-in. Id. at 795-96 n.3.
45. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796.
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so because of Green's participation in the stall-in and lock-in.4 6
Claiming violations of Title VII, Green filed a complaint with the
EEOC alleging that McDonnell Douglas had refused to rehire him
because of his race and his participation in the civil rights movement. 47
After investigating Green's allegations, the EEOC determined that
there was reasonable cause to believe that McDonnell Douglas had vio49
lated Title VII. 48 The EEOC then notified Green of his right to sue.
Green exercised that right within the statutory period.50
On review, the main issue before the Court was the order and allocation of proof in Title VII suits.5" The Court concluded that the
plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination, which the plaintiff could accomplish by showing the
following: (1) the plaintiff was a member of a class protected by Title
VII; (2) the employer sought applicants for a position for which the
plaintiff was qualified, and the plaintiff applied for that position; (3)
the employer rejected the plaintiff, despite his qualifications; and (4)
after rejecting the plaintiff, the employer continued to seek applications
from persons with the plaintiffs qualifications.52 The Court also
concluded that Green had made this showing.53
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the Court held, the
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 797. Specifically, the EEOC found sufficient evidence that McDonnell
Douglas violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Id.
49. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797. Congress delegated to the EEOC the power
and the responsibility to preclude any person from engaging in unlawful employment
practices as defined in sections 2000e-2 and 2000e-3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to § 2000e5 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Upon receipt of a charge of discrimination, the EEOC must
issue a notice of the charge to the employer within ten days and investigate the same.
Id. at § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC determines that there is reasonable cause to believe the
charge, the EEOC must attempt to resolve the conflict. Id. If attempts at resolution are
not successful, the EEOC shall, depending on the circumstances of the case, institute a
civil action itself, refer the matter to the Attorney General for the institution of a civil
action, or allow the complaining party to intervene, id. at § 2000e-5(f), which action is
commonly referred to as the issuance of a right to sue letter. See McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 797.
50. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 797.
5 1. Id. at 800. Addressing the allocation of proof issue, the Court balanced the congressional goal of eradicating discriminatory employment practices that disadvantage
minorities against the reality that Congress did not intend Title VII to guarantee a job to
every person without regard to qualifications. Id. at 800-01 (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971)).
52. Id. at 802. In effect, as noted in later cases, establishment of the prima facie case
creates a presumption of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. If unrebutted, this
presumption entitles the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993).
53. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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employer assumes a burden of "articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection., 54 The Court found
that McDonnell Douglas had met this burden and thereby rebutted
Green's prima facie case by showing that it refused to rehire Green
because of his unlawful activity. 5 Still, the Court did not reject
Green's claim. 56 Instead, it held that once a defendant offers legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the plaintiff must be
allowed to prove that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext
for intentional discrimination.57 If the plaintiff proves intentional discrimination, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. 58 Accordingly, the
Court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether
Green could show that McDonnell Douglas's proffered reason for not
re-hiring Green was a pretext for intentional discrimination. 9
McDonnell Douglas left unclear precisely how a defendant could
meet its burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

54. Id. Although the Court was precise in defining the plaintiffs initial burden as
establishing a prima facie case, it was imprecise in defining the nature of the defendant's
burden and the nature of the plaintiffs ultimate burden. See id. at 802-03; see also supra
note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the McDonnell Douglas Court's failure to
precisely define the defendant's burden). All that is clear from McDonnell Douglas is
that some type of burden shifts to the defendant once the plaintiff establishes the prima
facie case. The Court commented on the nature of this burden in Fumco Const. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), explaining that the "burden which shifts to the employer
is merely that of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race." Id. at 577. The Furnco Court also
explained that if the factfinder rejects the defendant's proffered reasons, the court can
infer that the challenged employment action was "more likely than not" based on illegal
discrimination. Id.
55. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-804.
56. Id. at 804.
57. Id.
5 8. Id. at 807. The Court stated:
On retrial, respondent [Green] must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that ... [McDonnell Douglas's] assigned reason for refusing to reemploy was a pretext or discriminatory in its application. If the District Judge
so finds, he must order a prompt and appropriate remedy. In the absence of
such a finding, petitioner's refusal to rehire must stand.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the Court
allowed the district court to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon a finding that
the proffered reason was a pretext or that the employment practice was discriminatory in
its application. Id. This is the precise holding in St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749; see
also infra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the St. Mary's holding).
59. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807. On remand, the district court held that
McDonnell Douglas's "stated reasons were not mere pretext" and that those "reasons are
adequate under the law for [McDonnell Douglas] not to rehire [Green]." Green v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 390 F. Supp. 501, 503 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff'd 528 F.2d
1102 (8th Cir. 1976).
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for its actions.6° Consequently, the Supreme Court addressed that
issue in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.6 ' In
Burdine, the Court held that the plaintiffs establishment of a prima
facie case raises a rebuttable presumption that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.62 Citing McDonnell Douglas,
the Burdine Court also held that the defendant's burden of proffering a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is merely a burden of production
and that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion throughout the
case. 6 3 Under Burdine, the defendant need not prove that it was
actually motivated by the proffered reasons, for the "ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discrimi' 64
nated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.
Still, the defendant must clearly articulate legally sufficient 65 reasons
for the adverse employment action 66 in order to frame the factual issue
67
such that the plaintiff has a sufficient opportunity to prove pretext.
Burdine dictates that once the defendant meets its burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the plaintiffs
burden to show the reason was a pretext merges with the plaintiffs
ultimate burden of convincing the court that he or she was a victim of
intentional discrimination.68 The plaintiff can meet the ultimate burden
in one of two ways: Either directly, by persuading the court that a
60. See id. at 802-03. The Court did not clearly articulate the nature of the defendant's
burden in McDonnell Douglas because the Court found it clear that McDonnell Douglas's
proffered reason, unlawful conduct by Green, clearly justified its decision not to rehire
Green. Id. However, in dicta the Court stated that McDonnell Douglas's proffered reason
"suffice[d] to discharge petitioner's burden of proof at this stage and to meet
respondent's prima facie case of discrimination." Id. at 803. The Court's reference to the
defendant's burden as a burden of proof ultimately confused the circuit courts and required
the Court to revisit the issue in Burdine. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; see also infra
notes 61-69 and accompanying text (discussing the Burdine holding).
61. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
62. Id. at 254.
63. Id. at 254-56. Compare International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977) (noting that "[p]resumptions shifting the burden of proof are
often created to reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and to conform with a party's
superior access to the proof') (emphasis added) with Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255
(explaining that the defendant's burden is one of production). See also infra part II.D.
(discussing the role of FED. R. EVID. 301 in the use of presumptions).
64. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
65. Proffered reasons are legally sufficient if they would allow a court to find in favor
of the defendant. Id. at 254-55.
66. Id. at 255. In explaining how the defendant must meet its burden, the Court stated
that an employer's answer to the complaint or argument will not suffice; the reason must
be admitted into evidence. Id. at 255 n.9.
67. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
68. Id. at 256.
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discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the employer's
adverse action, or indirectly, by showing that the employer's proffered
reason is not credible.6 9
Two years after Burdine, the Court again attempted to clarify the
allocation of proof in Title VII cases. In United States PostalService
Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 the Court held that once the defendant responds to the plaintiffs prima facie case by offering evidence of
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment
action, the McDonnell Douglas/Burdinepresumption "'drops from the
case,"' and the factfinder must then decide whether the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.7' Under Aikens, once
the presumption dissolves, the plaintiff may meet his or her ultimate
burden of persuasion in one of two ways: (1) by directly persuading
the court that the adverse employment action was more likely than not
motivated by intentional discrimination; or (2) by showing that the
proffered reason was not the real reason for the adverse employment
action.7 2

The Aikens Court explained that the factfinder must necessarily
decide which party it believes in order to determine whether "'the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.' 73 In this
respect, the Aikens court concluded, Title VII cases are identical to
other cases in which a factfinder must decide ultimate questions of fact
through an inquiry that examines both parties' states of mind.74 Such
an inquiry allows the trier of fact to find in favor of a Title
75 VII plaintiff
intent.
discriminatory
of
evidence
"direct
without
even
Until St. Mary's, then, the three stages of burden shifting in Title
VII cases were as follows: First, the plaintiff had to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, which then raised a rebuttable presumption that the defendant's actions constituted intentional discrimination
proscribed by Title VII. Next, the employer assumed a burden to pro69. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05). Although the Burdine court
cites McDonnell Douglas, there is no textual support in McDonnell Douglas for this
proposition. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
70. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
7 1. Id. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10) (citations omitted).
72. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
73. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715-16 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
74. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716. The Aikens Court remanded the case because it found
that the district court incorrectly required Aikens to submit direct evidence of intentional
discrimination. Id. at 717. The Aikens Court noted that as in any other cause of action,
the plaintiff in a Title VII intentional employment discrimination case could prove his
case by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 714 n.3.
75. Id. at 717.
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duce legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action and thereby
rebut the presumption created by the plaintiffs prima facie case.
Finally, to prevail, the plaintiff had to satisfy his or her ultimate burden
of proving intentional discrimination, by either direct or indirect evidence of the defendant's discriminatory intent.
C. The Circuits'Attemptto Apply the "Clarified"
McDonnell Douglas Framework
Even though the Supreme Court attempted in Burdine and Aikens to
clarify and refine the McDonnell Douglasframework, 76 the federal circuits remained split on the precise manner in which a Title VII plaintiff
discharges his or her ultimate burden of persuasion.77 Prior to the St.
Mary's decision, some circuits took the view that upon proving that
the defendant's proffered reasons are a pretext, the plaintiff is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. 78 The critical aspect of this, the socalled "pretext" approach, is that it does not require the plaintiff to
actually prove that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff. Instead, it merely requires that the factfinder disbelieve the
defendant's proffered reasons for the adverse employment action. For
example, in King v. Palmer,79 the District of Columbia Circuit held
that once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination
and discredits the defendant's proffered reasons for its action, the
plaintiff prevails as a matter of law.80 The Second,8 ' Third, 2 Fifth, 3
76. See supra part II.B.
77. See infra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
79. 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
80. Id. at 881.
81. Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 228 (1991) (holding that the plaintiff need not directly prove discrimination
and requiring only that the plaintiff prove that the defendant's articulated reasons were
not the true reasons for the adverse employment action).
82. Carden v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1988)
(holding that although the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against him, proof that defendant's proffered reason was pretextual is equivalent to a finding of intentional discrimination).
83. Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 639-40 (5th Cir.
1985). As the Thornbrough court explained:
By disproving the reasons offered by the employer to rebut the plaintiffs
prima facie case, the plaintiff recreates the situation that obtained when the
prima facie case was initially established: in the absence of any known
reasons for the employer's decision, we presume that the employer was
motivated by discriminatory reasons . . . . [U]nlike Humpty-Dumpty, the
employee's prima facie case can be put back together again, through proof that
the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual.
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Eighth," and Eleventh Circuits" also adopted the pretext approach.
Other circuits concluded that proof that the defendant's proffered
reasons are a pretext, by itself, is insufficient to entitle a plaintiff to
judgment. Rather, these courts adopted the so-called "pretext-plus"
approach, under which a plaintiff can prevail only upon a factual find-86
ing that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.
For example, in Benzies v. Illinois Departmentof Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities,87 the Seventh Circuit explained that the
plaintiff may prevail only by proving both that the defendant's proffered reasons were a pretext and that but for intentional discrimination,88
the defendant would not have taken the adverse employment action.
The First, 89 Fourth, 90 Sixth, 9' and Tenth 92 Circuits adopted similar
approaches.
D. FederalRule 301: Presumptions in Federal Civil Proceedings

Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the use of pre84. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S.
Ct. 2742 (1993) (holding that once the plaintiff disproves the defendant's proffered
reasons, the plaintiff is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law").
85. Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11 th Cir. 1990) (explaining that
a Title VII plaintiff can prevail with direct or indirect proof of discrimination, and if the
defendant's proffered reason is not worthy of belief, the plaintiff has satisfied his ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination). But see Clark v. Huntsville City
Bd. of Ed., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding in an earlier decision that a
Title VII plaintiff will prevail only when the defendant's proffered reason is a pretext for
intentional racial discrimination).
86. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
87. 810 F.2d 146 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987).
88. Benzies, 810 F.2d at 148.
89. In Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1991), the court held that
the plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment upon the establishment of a prima facie
case and proof that the defendant's proffered reasons were not the real reasons for the
adverse employment action. Id. at 392. Instead, if the finder of fact might also draw a
contrary reason for the adverse employment action, an issue of material fact exists, thus
precluding summary judgment. Id.
90. In Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1989), the court held that a
finding that a defendant's proffered reasons are unworthy of credence does not entitle the
plaintiff to judgment; instead the reason underlying the lack of credence must be the
presence of discrimination. Id. at 828.
91. In Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1497 (1992), the court noted that the defendant bears the burden of
production only, and that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion throughout the case. Id. at 282-83. Thus, the court held that the plaintiff must persuade the court
that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. at
283.
92. See E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co. Inc., 986 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination, the ultimate finding of
which is a question of fact).
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sumptions in federal civil proceedings not otherwise exempted by
Congress.93 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiffs
establishment of a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption
that the adverse employment action was more likely than not based on
intentional discrimination prohibited by Title VII.94 Accordingly, Rule
301 is integral to Title VII intentional employment discrimination
cases. 95 Rule 301 dictates that the party against whom a presumption
is raised assumes a burden of producing evidence to rebut the
presumption.96
The Court decided several Title VII cases involving burden shifting
issues without reference to Rule 301, which became effective in 1975,

93. FED. R. EvID. 301. An effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to remove Title
VII disparate impact claims from the coverage of Rule 301. See, Kingsley R. Brown,
The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill," A Codification of Griggs, A Partial
Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV., 287, 291 (1993)
(discussing the effect of the 1991 Act on defendants' burdens of production and
persuasion in disparate impact cases).
In pertinent part the 1991 Act provides that disparate impact is established if:
[A] complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that
the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title VII § 703, 105 Stat. 1074 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. Ill1991)) (emphasis
added). The 1991 Act further provides that "[t]he term 'demonstrates' means meets the
burdens of production and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m).
Unlike intentional discrimination, disparate impact requires no proof of discriminatory intent; instead, it focuses on an "employment practice that causes a disparate
impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(A)(i).
Intentional discrimination cases are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). See supra
note 27 and accompanying text. Congress did not amend this section in the 1991 Act.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Because Congress did not amend the section under which
intentional discrimination cases are brought, and because Congress did amend the section on disparate impact claims, it logically follows that Congress intended that the
defendant employer's burden in intentional employment discrimination cases is one of
production only.
94. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53.
95. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.
96. FED. R. EvID. 301. The rule provides that:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of
Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the
presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense
of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the
party on whom it was originally cast.
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nearly two years after the McDonnell Douglas decision. 97 In retrospect, the Court's use of presumptions in the post-1975 cases was
inconsistent with the dictates of the then nascent Rule 301. For
example, in Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo.,98 the Court held
that the Title VII defendant's burden was to prove that plaintiffs were
not victims of hiring discrimination.99 The Court later explained its
Franks holding as consistent with the way in which presumptions are
generally raised, noting that presumptions shifting the burden of proof
often reflect judicial evaluations of probabilities and a given party's
superior access to proof.'0°
By 1978, the Court was attempting to clarify the confusion which
had come to surround presumptions in Title VII cases. In Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters,t ' the Court described the employer's
burden as requiring proof that the adverse employment action was
based on something other than race. 0 2 Quoting McDonnell Douglas,
the Court characterized this burden as merely requiring that the defendant articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
03
action. 1
It was not until Burdine in 1981 that the Court first applied Rule 301
to a Title VII case. In Burdine, the Court announced that the Title VII
defendant's burden is one of production and not proof, while also
noting that Rule 301 governs the role of presumptions in Title VII
intentional employment discrimination cases. 10 4 The Court would
97. McDonnell Douglas was decided on May 14, 1973. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 792. Rule 301 became effective on July 1, 1975. Pub, L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat.
1926, 1931 (FED. R. EvID. 301) (1988). Furthermore, the version of Rule 301 proposed
by the Supreme Court provided:
In all cases not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules a
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its
existence.
PROP. FED. RULE EVID. 301, 56 F.R.D. 183, 208 (1972) (emphasis added). Congress
rejected the Supreme Court's suggestion in favor of the version currently in force.
98. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Franks is a disparate impact case. Id. at 772.
99. Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
100. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45
(1977). Although the explanation is clearly inconsistent with the version of Rule 301
that Congress adopted, it is consistent with the Supreme Court's proposed rule, which
was submitted to but rejected by Congress. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
101. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
102. Id. at 577.
103. Id. at 578 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). By explaining that
the burden of "proof' only required that the defendant articulate some legitimate reason
for its action, the Court was able to comply with the principles of stare decisis as well as
statutory rules of construction.
104. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8. "If the defendant carries this burden of produc-
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revisit these points again in St. Mary's, nearly two decades after Rule
301 was originally adopted.' °5
III. DISCUSSION
Due to the aforementioned split in the circuits,'' 6 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks to decide
whether the factfinder's rejection of a Title VII defendant's proffered
reasons for its adverse employment action "mandates a finding for the
plaintiff."'0 7 In a five-to-four decision, the Court ruled that an
employee is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law even if the
factfinder does not believe the defendant's proffered reasons are genuine. 01 8 Instead, the Court held, the plaintiff must prove that the proffered reasons are not credible and that the defendant based the adverse
action on discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 0 9 The St. Mary's
dissent argued that this "clarification" of the McDonnell Douglas
framework makes the requirements of proof of discrimination under
Title VII "unfair and unworkable."" 0
A. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks:
The FactsAnd OpinionsBelow
St. Mary's Honor Center ("St. Mary's") is a Missouri Department
of Corrections and Human Resources ("MDCHR") minimum security
correctional facility."' St. Mary's hired Melvin Hicks as a correctional officer in 1978 and promoted him to shift commander in
1980.112 Acting upon complaints about the conditions at St. Mary's
and resulting investigations, MDCHR made numerous supervisory
changes at St. Mary's in January 1984." 3 St. Mary's retained Hicks
tion, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted." Id. at 255. The Court
specifically cited to Rule 301 in explaining the role of presumptions in Title VII cases.
Id. at 255 n.8.
105. See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
106. See supra part II.C.
107. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
108. Id. at 2749.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting).
111. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). The Supreme Court
refers to St. Mary's as a halfway house. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746. For purposes of
clarity in the footnote text, the short citation form Hicks will be used when referring to
the district court's opinion and the short citation form St. Mary's will be used when
referring to the Supreme Court's opinion.
112. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. -at 1246.
113. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246 nn.1-3. An MDCHR assistant director had
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but replaced his immediate supervisor with John Powell and replaced
the superintendent of St. Mary's with Steve Long. 1 4 Hicks is an
African-American and both Powell and Long are white." 5
Prior to the personnel changes at St. Mary's, Hicks's employment
record was satisfactory, but following the changes, Hicks was sub1 6
jected to numerous and increasingly severe disciplinary actions.
The actions included: a five day suspension for violation of institutional rules by Hicks's subordinates;" 7 a letter of reprimand for
alleged failure to adequately investigate an inmate brawl;" 8 and a
demotion from shift commander to correctional officer because
Hicks's subordinates failed to document their use of an official vehicle. " 9 MDCHR eventually fired Hicks for threatening Powell in June
"received numerous complaints from inmates, former inmates, staff, legislators and
other concerned citizens." Id. at 1246. Based on the complaints received, MDCHR
initiated an undercover investigation at St. Mary's and made a series of unannounced
inspections at the facility. Id. As a result of the investigations and the subsequent failure of several employees to take effective corrective actions, St. Mary's made the following personnel changes: St. Mary's replaced superintendent Arthur Schulte (white) with
Steve Long (white); John Powell (white), who was Hicks's immediate supervisor,
replaced Gilbert Greenlee (African-American) as chief of custody; J.R. Wilson (white)
replaced Carl McAvoy (African-American) as a shift supervisor; and Carl McAvoy
(African-American) replaced Charles Woodard (African-American). Id. at 1246 nn.1-3.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1245-47.
117. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246-47. The violations arose on March 3, 1984, while
Hicks was on duty as a shift commander. Id. at 1246. When two St. Mary's transportation officers arrived to pick up inmates who were scheduled for outside work, the officers
noticed that the front-door officer was absent from his assigned post and that the lights
were off on the first floor. Id. One of the two officers filed an incident report with
Hicks's supervisor, John Powell. Id. A four-person disciplinary review committee, consisting of two whites and two African-Americans, recommended a five day suspension
for Hicks, which the Director of MDCHR ultimately approved in accordance with the
department's procedural requirements. Id. at 1246-47.
118. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1247. Powell gave Hicks a letter of reprimand on March
29, 1984, for failure to take appropriate action on the following events: On March 21,
1984, two inmates were involved in a fight and one received medical treatment. Id. On
the way to the hospital, the injured inmate told the correctional officer accompanying
him that he was injured in a fight, rather than by lifting weights as he first claimed. Id.
The officer reported the altercation to Hicks, and Hicks directed the officer to file a
report. Id. On March 24, 1984, Powell submitted a report to Long, superintendent of St.
Mary's, charging Hicks with failure to investigate the report. Id.
119. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1247. On April 19, 1984, St. Mary's notified Hicks that
it demoted him for the following conduct: On March 19, 1984, Hicks ordered a correctional officer to use a St. Mary's automobile to follow another correctional officer to a
friend's home in order to return a borrowed private automobile. Id. Neither officer had
logged use of the St. Mary's vehicle as required by institutional rules. Id. Powell
recommended disciplinary action, and the disciplinary review committee, again composed of two whites and two African-Americans, recommended demotion of Hicks. Id.

284

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 25

1984.120 From January 1984 to June 1984, Hicks had reported to
Powell numerous violations of St. Mary's rules by some of his white
co-workers and subordinates.121 Powell took no action, however,
because he believed that shift commanders and subordinates
should
22
resolve their disagreements without involving him. 1
Following his termination, Hicks sued St. Mary's in federal court
on three counts: (I) that St. Mary's discriminated against him because
of his race in violation of Title VII; 123 (II) that St. Mary's and Long

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and (III) that Long violated 42 U.S.C.24§
1983 by demoting and subsequently firing him because of his race.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of St. Mary's
on Count 11.125 After a three-day trial, 126 the court found in favor of
St. Mary's on Counts I and 111.127 In reaching that decision, the court
28
noted that Hicks had established a prima facie case under Title VII,

and that St. Mary's had met its burden of proffering a legitimate reason
Powell, who was on the board, recommended termination. Id. The other employees
involved were not disciplined. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246.
120. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1247-48. St. Mary's terminated Hicks on June 7, 1984
for threatening Powell. In a meeting between Steve Long, Vincent Banks, and John
Powell, Hicks was notified of his demotion, resulting from his failure to log use of a St.
Mary's vehicle. Id. at 1247. Hicks requested the remainder of the day off because he was
very upset. Id. Long granted the request and. as Hicks attempted to leave, Powell
followed him and demanded his shift commander's manual. Id. The two men argued and
Hicks stated that he would "step outside" with Powell. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1247.
Powell warned that those words could constitute a threat. Id. The two men did not fight
but Powell reported the incident. Id. On May 9, 1984, a four person disciplinary board,
consisting of at least two African-Americans, voted to suspend Hicks for three days. Id.
Long disregarded the board's vote and recommended that Hicks be terminated, based on
the severity and accumulation of Hicks's violations. Id. at 1248.
121. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1248. The most serious violation occurred when one of
Hicks's subordinates, Edward Ratliff, a white male, entered St. Mary's with his brother, a
deputy marshal. Id. In direct violation of Hicks's instructions, Ratliff told his brother
that he need not check his firearm prior to entering St. Mary's. Id. Hicks reported the
incident to Powell who refused to take action. Id.
122. Id.
123. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1245.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1253. The elements are the same for both Title VII and §
1983 claims when a plaintiff brings them together. Id.
128. Id. at 1249-50. The court decided that Hicks had established a prima facie case
by proving: (1) that he was African-American, and therefore, a member of a protected
class under Title VII; (2) that he was qualified for the job because he had maintained a
satisfactory record until Powell became his supervisor; (3) that he was adversely affected
by the demotion and subsequent termination; and (4) that St. Mary's filled his position
with a white male. Id.
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for the adverse employment action. 29 The court determined, however, that even though Hicks proved that St. Mary's proffered reasons
were a pretext, 30 he failed to prove, either directly or indirectly,
that
13
St. Mary's had discriminated against him because of his race.'
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the Title
VII and section 1983 claims 132 because it rejected the district court's
conclusion that St. Mary's actions were personally motivated rather
than discriminatory. 13
129. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1250. St. Mary's claimed to have terminated Hicks
because of the violations set forth supra in notes 117-120.
130. Id. at 1250-51. Hicks proved that St. Mary's proffered reason was a pretext by
showing that he was the only person disciplined for violations that his subordinates
committed. Id. at 1250. The district court recognized that "much more serious violations, when committed by plaintiffs co-workers, were either disregarded or treated much
more leniently." Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1251. The most striking example of the disparate treatment involved an inmate escape that occurred on the shift of acting shift
commander Michael Doss, a white male. Id. Doss admitted that his negligence caused
the escape. Id. Although Doss's violation was more serious than failing to document
use of an official vehicle, Doss only received a letter of reprimand. Id.
131. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1252. In sum, the court noted that "although plaintiff
has proven the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather than personally motivated." Id. The court explained that
Powell, aided by Ratliff and Long, put Hicks on the "express track to termination." Id.
at 1251. The court rejected Hicks's evidence of disproportionate firing of AfricanAmericans, however, because, even though approximately twelve African-Americans
and one white were fired, there were 30 African-Americans employed at St. Mary's in
January 1984 and 29 in December 1984. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1252. In addition, St.
Mary's hired 13 African-Americans during that period. Id. Thus, the court reasoned that
the personnel changes did not create an inference of racial discrimination. Id.
Similarly, the court rejected Hicks's argument that the following personnel changes
constituted racial discrimination: prior to Long's tenure there were five AfricanAmerican supervisors and one white supervisor; after Long's personnel changes there
were two African-American supervisors and four white supervisors. Hicks, 756 F. Supp.
at 1252. The court found no discrimination under these circumstances for three reasons.
First, MDCHR directed the personnel changes because the institution was poorly run.
Id. Second, St. Mary's filled one supervisory position with a white male only after an
African-American male declined the position; had the African-American accepted the
position, the ratio of African-Americans to whites would have been three to three. Id.
Finally the disciplinary review board that recommended Hick's demotion was comprised
of two African-Americans and two whites. Id. The district court did not give any weight
to the fact that Long recommended termination even though the board voted only to
suspend Hicks. Id. at 1247-48.
132. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993) [hereinafter "Hicks I'.
The court remanded for further findings
consistent with its opinion. Id. at 493.
133. Id. at 492. The Eighth Circuit went on to question whether personal motivation
would ever be sufficiently legitimate to not amount to discrimination under similar
circumstances. Id. Nonetheless, the circuit court refused to address that issue because St.
Mary's never asserted that personal animosity was one of its legitimate reasons for
firing Hicks. Id.
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B. The Opinion of the Supreme Court
On review, the United States Supreme Court reversed, 3 4 holding
that although the factfinder's disbelief of an employer's proffered reasons may permit a finding of intentional discrimination, such disbelief
does not compel judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law.' 3 5
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began by tracing the Court's
Title VII decisions.' 36 He first explained that in McDonnell
Douglas,137 the Court established the allocation of burden and order of
proof in Title VII intentional employment discrimination cases. 38 He
then reiterated the Burdine holding 39 that a plaintiffs establishment of
a prima facie case of discrimination creates a rebuttable presumption
that the employer's motivation for the adverse employment action was
impermissible discrimination." Justice Scalia stressed that the burden
then assumed by the defendant to articulate a legitimate reason for the
adverse practice is one of production, not proof, and that the ultimate
burden of141persuading the trier of fact remains at all times with the
plaintiff.
Justice Scalia rejected as dictum the Burdine statement that the
plaintiff may prevail either directly, through proof of discrimination, or
indirectly, by showing that the defendant's proffered reason is unworthy of belief. 142 In addition, Justice Scalia explained that Aikens made
134. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2756. The Court remanded the case to the Eighth
Circuit to determine whether the district court's conclusion that race was not the real
reason for the adverse employment action was clearly erroneous. Id.
135. Id. at 2749.
136. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2746. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2745.
137. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see supra notes 33-59 and accompanying text (discussing
McDonnell Douglas).
138. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2745.
139. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
140. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747. For the first time, the Court carefully explained
the nature of the defendant's burden and the precise effect that the presumption has in
Title VII cases:
To establish a "presumption" is to say that a finding of the predicate fact
(here, the prima facie case) produces "a required conclusion in the absence of
explanation" (here, the finding of unlawful discrimination). Thus, the
McDonnell Douglas presumption places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie case-i.e., the burden of
"producing evidence."
Id. (quoting 1 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 67,
at 536 (1977)).
141. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747-48. The Court explained that Rule 301 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence governs this presumption. Id. at 2747.
142. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2752-53. Justice Scalia pointed out, however, that
although Burdine cites McDonnell Douglas for this proposition, McDonnell Douglas
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clear that once the defendant responds to the plaintiffs prima facie
case, the factfinder's ultimate task is not merely to decide whether that
response is credible, but rather to decide whether the adverse employment action constituted intentional discrimination proscribed by Title
VII.1 43 Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, once a defendant introduces a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action, the presumption of discrimination raised by the plaintiffs prima facie case
drops from the case. 44 The plaintiff must then, through his or her
case-in-chief and cross-examinations, be allowed a "full and fair
opportunity" to prove that the defendant's proffered reasons were not
the real reasons for the adverse action, but that
instead, discrimination
45
1
action.
the
prompted
VII
Title
by
prohibited
Applying this analysis to the specifics of St. Mary's, Justice Scalia
rejected the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that once the plaintiff persuades the factfinder to disbelieve the defendant's proffered reasons,
46
the defendant is left in the same position as if it had remained silent.1
Instead, Justice Scalia reasoned, once the defendant introduces evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, the presumption of
discrimination drops from the case, whether or not those reasons are
ultimately persuasive. 47 Thus, at the close of the defendant's case-inchief, judgment for the plaintiff is proper if a rational person would
conclude: (1) that the facts establish a prima facie case; and (2) that the
defendant has failed to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for his
conduct.'48 If the defendant does articulate a nondiscriminatory reason
for its action, Justice Scalia observed, the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
presumption drops from the case, and consequently, the factfinder
must then decide whether the plaintiff has proved intentional discrimination. 4 9 Although a determination by the factfinder that the proffered
does not support the proposition. Id. at 2753. Accordingly, Justice Scalia concluded
that the Burdine statement "must be regarded as an inadvertence, to the extent that it
describes disproof of the defendant's reason as a totally independent, rather than an auxiliary, means of proving unlawful intent." Id.
143. Id. at 2753. Justice Scalia explained that Aikens clearly states that "'the ultimate question [is] discrimination vel non."' Id. (quoting United States Postal Service
Bd. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)).
144. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
145. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981)).
146. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2748.
147. Id. at 2748-49. As Justice Scalia pointed out, this reading is entirely consistent
with the requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 301, which governs presumptions
in civil proceedings. Id. at 2747; see supra part I.D.
148. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2748.

149.

Id. at 2749.
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reasons are not believable will permit the factfinder to infer intentional
discrimination, Justice Scalia concluded, disbelieving the reasons
alone does not compel judgment for the plaintiff. 50
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Writing for the dissent, Justice Souter rejected the majority opinion
because he believed it abandoned the McDonnell Douglas framework
for a "scheme of proof ...that promises to be unfair and unworkable." ' Specifically, Justice Souter charged that the majority ignored
language in McDonnell Douglas that mandates judgment for the plaintiff once he or she proves pretext' 52 and that the majority flatly misread
Burdine. 53 Consequently, Justice Souter maintained, Title VII plaintiffs without direct evidence of discrimination
will now find it much
14
1
cases.
their
prove
to
more difficult
According to Justice Souter, the Court adopted the McDonnell
Douglas framework to allow factfinders to effectively resolve intentional employment discrimination claims, which often can be proven
only through circumstantial evidence.'55 By requiring the defendant to
introduce into evidence one or more reasons for the adverse employment action, Justice Souter opined, the framework fairly accommodates the competing interests and unequal access to proof held by
plaintiffs and defendants. 56 Although Justice Souter agreed with the
majority that the presumption of discrimination drops from the case
once the defendant introduces legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons
150. Id.
151. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2757 (Souter, J.,dissenting). Justices White,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the dissenting opinion. Id.
152. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated:
McDonnell Douglas makes it clear that if the plaintiff fails to show 'pretext,'
the challenged employment action 'must stand.' If, on the other hand, the
plaintiff carries his burden of showing 'pretext,' the court 'must order a prompt
and appropriate remedy.'
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
153. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter pointed out that the majority repeated
"the truism that the plaintiff has the 'ultimate burden' of proving discrimination without
ever facing the practical question of how the plaintiff without such direct evidence can
meet this burden." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
156. See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2758 (Souter, J.,dissenting). Justice Souter
explained the defendant's interest as coming forward with evidence to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The plaintiffs interest, on the other
hand, is to not be saddled with "the burden of either producing direct evidence of discriminatory intent or eliminating the entire universe of possible nondiscriminatory reasons
for a personnel decision." Id. (Souter, J.,dissenting).
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for its action, he pointed out that the majority neglected to include the
corresponding requirement that the proffered reasons "'frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."' 51 7 This requirement,
Justice Souter urged, narrows the question to whether the defendant's
proffered reasons are pretextual 5 8 and necessarily confines the
factfinder's inquiry to only those proffered reasons.1 59 The plaintiff
can then prevail either directly, by showing that discrimination was
more likely than not at the root of the adverse employment practice, or
indirectly, by proving
that the defendant's proffered reasons were not
1 60
the real reasons.

After arguing that the majority abandoned the McDonnell Douglas
framework, Justice Souter emphasized that retaining the framework is
necessary to implement Title VII in a manner consistent with the congressional purpose of eliminating discriminatory employment
practices.' 6 The McDonnell Douglas framework, Justice Souter
157. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981)). It is on this point that Justice Souter disagreed with the Court's opinion. Compare Justice Souter's interpretation (interpreting
the Burdine Court's statement to mean that the employer "has a 'burden of production'
that gives it the right to choose the scope of the factual issues to be resolved by the
factfinder" and that the scope it chooses binds the employer as well as the plaintiff), St.
Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (Souter, J. dissenting) with Justice Scalia's view
(interpreting the Burdine Court's statement to mean that "'pretext' means 'pretext for
discrimination,' . . . [and that] the sentence must be understood as addressing the form
rather than the substance of the defendant's production burden: The requirement that the
employer 'clearly set forth' its reasons gives the plaintiff a 'full and fair' rebuttal
opportunity.") Id. at 2752 (citations omitted).
158. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2760 (Souter, J.,dissenting). In support of this conclusion, Justice Souter quoted the Burdine language, which he determined allows the
plaintiff to succeed merely by showing that "'the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence."' Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
But see infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text (explaining that this statement is
dictum and is not supported by McDonnell Douglas).
159. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting). The majority rejected
this reading, and explained that the more reasonable reading is that proving that the
defendant's proffered reason was false becomes part of the plaintiffs ultimate burden of
proving intentional discrimination. Id. at 2752 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
161. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting). In fact, the framework
has been expanded throughout the spectrum of Title VII claims as well as other types of
discrimination, such as that protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained that the decision in St. Mary's will
therefore frustrate the purpose of Congress in adopting Title VII because employees will
be less likely to sue because "any conceivable explanation for the employer's actions
that might be suggested by the evidence, however unrelated to the employer's articulated
reasons, must be addressed by a plaintiff who does not wish to risk losing." Id. at 2763
(Souter, J., dissenting). If the plaintiff nonetheless decides to sue, according to Justice
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urged, allows the factfinder to efficiently resolve the elusive question62
of whether an employer intended to discriminate against a plaintiff.
Justice Souter concluded that the majority holding allows "the
factfinder... to roam the record, searching for some nondiscriminatory explanation that the defendant has not
raised and that the plaintiff
' 63
has had no fair opportunity to disprove."'
To demonstrate his point, Justice Souter noted that Hicks had been
denied the opportunity to demonstrate that the supposedly race-neutral
motivation proffered as a reason for his termination-the personal
animosity of his supervisor-was not credible. 64 In fact, Justice
Souter noted, as had the Eighth Circuit, 65 that the district court did not
find that personal animosity was the real reason for firing Hicks-it
66
merely deduced that animosity could have been the real reason.,
Thus, explained Justice Souter, although the majority remanded the
case to determine whether the district court's conclusion that Hicks
was not fired because of his race was clearly erroneous, 167 the majority
precluded any opportunity for Hicks to show that personal animosity
was a pretext for discriminatory treatment. 68 In conclusion, Justice
Souter noted that whether Hicks ultimately wins or loses, "many
plaintiffs in a like position will surely lose under the scheme adopted
by the Court today, unless they possess both prescience and resources
beyond what
this Court has previously required Title VII litigants to
69
employ." 1
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court's decision in St. Mary's rejected both the pretext and

Souter,
162.
163.
164.
165.

the trial will certainly be a tedious affair. Id. (Souter, J.,dissenting).
id. at 2763 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8).
St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2757, (Souter, J.,dissenting).
Id. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Hicks I1,970 F.2d at 492.

166. Id.
167. See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2756. The district court held that although Hicks
proved that the violations that ultimately led to his demotion and discharge were a pretext, he did not prove either directly or indirectly that the real reason for his treatment
was race. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1252.
168. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2766 (Souter, J. dissenting). But see Hicks v. St.
Mary's Honor Ctr., 2 F.3d 265, 267 (8th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter "Hicks III"] (holding,
on remand from the Supreme Court, that because neither party had presented evidence on
the question of personal animosity it was necessary to remand the case for consideration
of that issue; the court also went so far as to note that "the district court may decide to
hold an evidentiary hearing" on the matter).
169. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2766 (Souter, J.,dissenting).

19941

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks

pretext-plus approaches. The Court rejected the pretext approach 7° by
holding that a Title VH intentional employment discrimination plaintiff
is not entitled to judgment upon the factfinder's rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons. 17' The Court rejected the pretext-plus
approach 72 by allowing that plaintiffs may prevail upon an ultimate
finding of intentional discrimination that is based on disbelief of the
defendant's proffered reasons.7 7 The Court has thus created a hybrid
approach, which, unlike either the pretext or pretext-plus approaches,
permits but does not mandate a finding of
intentional discrimination
174
upon disbelief of the defendant's reasons.
Although the Court was sharply divided on the outcome of St.
Mary's, the majority and dissent agreed on the following four points:
(1) once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must
articulate nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment
action; 75 (2) if the defendant does not meet this burden of production,
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; 7 6 (3) once the
defendant produces legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
adverse employment action, the presumption of discrimination drops
from the case; 177 and (4) once the presumption drops, the plaintiff
78
must meet the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination.
The majority and dissent parted company on the issue of whether
the plaintiff can prevail by disproving the defendant's proffered
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. 179 The majority concluded
that although a plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
upon the factfinder's rejection of the proffered reasons,' the
factfinder may infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination from
that rejection.' l8 In contrast, the dissent would omit the requirement of
170. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
171. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
172. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
173. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
174. Id.
175. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; id. at 2758-59 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747; id. at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749; id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting).
178. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747-48; id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting). The
plaintiffs burden at this final stage is the burden of proof. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at
2747; id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747-48; id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
181. Id. The Court stated:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
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an actual finding of intentional discrimination and would instead mandate judgment as a matter of law
whenever the plaintiff disproves the
82
defendant's proffered reasons.

It is on this point, the dissent argued, that St. Mary's is inconsistent
with two decades of precedent. 183 Justice Scalia responded that
"[o]nly one unfamiliar with our case-law will be upset by the dissent's
alarum that we are today setting aside 'settled precedent."' 84 Due to
the depth of the disagreement between the dissent and majority over
the correct interpretation of the "settled precedent," this section will
analyze seriatim McDonnell Douglas, Burdine, and Aikens, and
reliance thereon by the majority and dissent. 185 This section concludes
by examining the federal rule on presumptions, 86 upon which the St.
Mary's majority relied but which the dissent ignored.
A. McDonnell Douglas v. Green: Which Interpretationis Correct?
The St. Mary's majority opinion is consistent with McDonnell
Douglas, which, like St. Mary's, permits, but does not compel the
factfinder to infer intentional discrimination upon rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons.' 87 As the McDonnell Douglas Court
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination,
and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection,
"[no additional proof of discrimination is required."
Id. (footnote and citations omitted). The Court explained in a footnote to this excerpt
that although rejection of the defendant's "reasons is enough at law to sustain a finding
of discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination."Id. at 2749 n.4.
182. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter characterized the result of the Court's holding as follows:
[O]nce a Title VII plaintiff succeeds in showing at trial that the defendant has
come forward with pretextual reasons for its actions in response to a prima
facie showing of discrimination, the factfinder still may proceed to roam the
record, searching for some nondiscriminatory explanation that the defendant
has not raised and that the plaintiff has had no fair opportunity to disprove.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that such a result ignores the language
of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2757 (Souter, J. dissenting). Justice Souter asserted that the Court has
abandoned the McDonnell Douglas framework and the Court's subsequent decisions by
allowing the factfinder to roam the record in search of non-discriminatory reasons for
the adverse employment action. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
184. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2750 (quoting St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2757) (Souter,
J., dissenting)).
185. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2751. Justice Scalia noted that although it is generally
undesirable to dissect case law as if it were the United States Code, it was necessary to do
so in St. Mary's. Id.
186. FED. R. EVID. 301.
187. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.
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explained, once the defendant has responded to the plaintiffs prima
facie case, Title VII does not compel relief for the plaintiff unless the
plaintiff proves that the defendant's reasons were a pretext for discrimination prohibited by Title VII.88
The McDonnell Douglas Court set forth several ways in which a
plaintiff might prove that the defendant's purportedly legitimate reasons were actually a pretext for discrimination. 89 Each suggested
method of proof required that the plaintiff prove, through either direct
or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of race.' 90 Further, at four separate
points the McDonnell Douglas Court described exactly how a plaintiff
should be afforded the opportunity to prove that the defendant's proffered reasons were actually a pretext for discrimination.' 9' When
describing this process of discrediting the defendant's reasons, as
Justice Souter pointed out in St. Mary's,'92 the McDonnell Douglas
Court did not always expressly state that by "pretext" it was referring
exclusively to "pretext for discrimination.' 9 Nevertheless, examining the relevant language in context reveals that when the McDonnell
Douglas Court94 used "pretext," it meant pretext for intentional
discrimination. 1
188. Id. at 804.
189. Id. at 804-05. The Court identified the following as relevant to whether
McDonnell Douglas's reasons were a pretext: differences in treatment of white and
African-American employees; McDonnell Douglas's view of Green's lawful civil rights
activities; and statistical evidence which tended to show that McDonnell Douglas's
refusal to rehire Green "conformed to a general pattern of discrimination against
blacks." Id.
190. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
191. See id. at 804-07.
192. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2759 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-07.
194. Compare McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, stating that:
While Title VII does not, without more, compel rehiring of respondent, neither does it permit petitioner to use respondent's conduct as a pretext for the
sort of discrimination prohibited by § 703(a)(1). On remand, respondent
must, as the Court of Appeals recognized, be afforded a fair opportunity to
show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact
pretext.
with id. at 805 stating that:
In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for
his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.
with id. at 805 n.18, noting that:
We do, however, insist that respondent under § 703(a)(1) must be given a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that whatever the
stated reasons for his rejection, the decision was in reality racially premised.
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Justice Scalia made this very point in St. Mary's when he explained
that the McDonnell Douglas holding requires that the plaintiff prove
that the adverse action was a pretext for discrimination, and that in
McDonnell Douglas, "'pretext' means the pretext required earlier in the
[McDonnell Douglas] opinion, viz., 'pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by [Title VIII."" 95 Justice Souter, on the other hand,
contended that McDonnell Douglas made it clear that once the Title VII
plaintiff proves pretext, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.196 Although passages from McDonnell Douglas, when read in
isolation, support Justice Souter's view, Justice Scalia more accurately
identified the true holding of McDonnell Douglas.
Indeed, although Justice Souter accused the majority of rewriting
McDonnell Douglas,197 a careful comparison of the McDonnell
Douglas Court's own summary of its holding with Justice Souter's
interpretation reveals that Justice Souter actually rewrote McDonnell
Douglas to accommodate his reasoning.'98 In sum, despite Justice
Souter's protestations, St. Mary's is consistent with McDonnell
Douglas.
B. Burdine: Dicta Cited by Dissent is Inconsistent
with McDonnell Douglas
The Burdine decision also supports the St. Mary's result. In
Burdine, the Court stated that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of
persuading the factfinder that he or she has been a victim of intentional
and with id. at 807, summarizing its holding as requiring that:
On retrial, respondent must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that
petitioner's assigned reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its application. If the District Judge so finds, he must order a
prompt and appropriate remedy.
195. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2752 n.6 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
804) (citations omitted) (second alteration original).
196. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (Souter, J.,dissenting). Justice Souter argued
that McDonnell Douglas reconciled the competing interests of the plaintiff and the
defendant by requiring that the defendant introduce one or more reasons for the adverse
employment action. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). He later argued that the defendant's
choice of proffered reasons binds the plaintiff and the court and precludes consideration
of other evidence by the factfinder. Id. (Souter, J.,dissenting).
197. Id. at 2759 n.5 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
198. Compare St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (interpreting
the McDonnell Douglas summary as holding that once the plaintiff shows pretext he is
entitled to a prompt remedy) with McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807 (holding that if
the factfinder finds that the Title VII plaintiff demonstrates pretext, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment; absent such a finding, the defendant prevails). Note again that when
the McDonnell Douglas Court used the term "pretext," it meant pretext for discrimination. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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discrimination.'9 9 Citing McDonnell Douglas, the Burdine court also
stated that the plaintiff can discharge this burden either through direct
proof of discrimination or through indirect proof that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the adverse action. 20 Although
Justices Scalia and Souter agreed that this statement can mean nothing
less than that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment upon disproof of the
defendant's proffered reasons,20 ' Justice Scalia characterized the
statement as dictum, 20 2 pointing out that it is not supported by
McDonnell Douglas. °3
Justice Scalia also found the Burdine Court's statement inconsistent
with other passages in Burdine that require a finding of intentional discrimination. 20 4 A plain reading of Burdine shows Justice Scalia to be

correct. 205 The Burdine Court stated that the plaintiff bears the "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. ' 20 6 In yet another
passage, the Burdine Court reiterated:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must
have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason
was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
199. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
200. Id.
201. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
202. Id. at 2752-53. Justice Scalia concluded that the dictum at issue must be regarded
as an "inadvertence, to the extent that it describes disproof of the defendant's reason as a
totally independent, rather than an auxiliary, means of proving unlawful intent." Id. at
2753.
203. Id. at 2753; see supra note 69. Justice Scalia pointed out that the cited pages of
McDonnell Douglas do not support the inference drawn in Burdine. The only passage in
McDonnell Douglas that even vaguely support's the Burdine Court's statement is the
following: "In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision." McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 805. Yet in summarizing its opinion, the McDonnell Douglas Court stated:
On retrial, respondent must be afforded a fair opportunity to demonstrate that
petitioner's assigned reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its application. If the District Judge so finds, he must order a
prompt and appropriate remedy. In the absence of such a finding, petitioner's
refusal to rehire must stand.
Id. at 807. Thus, it seems that both the Burdine Court and Justice Souter fell into a similar trap: failing to carefully read the McDonnell Douglas Court's summary of its
holding, and relying instead on dicta.
204. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2753.
205. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-58. The Burdine Court summarized its decision by
stating: "We remain confident that the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination." Id. at 258.
206. Id. at 253.
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court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. 2°7

For his part, Justice Souter misinterpreted Burdine because he relied
primarily on dicta.20 8 Furthermore, he incorrectly argued that Burdine
limits the factfinder's inquiry to the defendant's proffered reasons.0 9
Once the defendant proffers its reasons, according to Justice Souter,
the factfinder's inquiry is limited to only those reasons.210
To the contrary, Burdine mandates that upon establishment of the
plaintiffs prima facie case, the defendant must set forth legitimate reasons for the adverse employment action. 21 This frames the factual
issues so that the plaintiff has "a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. ' 212 The plaintiffs burden then merges with the
plaintiffs ultimate burden of proving that he or she was the target of
intentional discrimination.2 3
In sum, then, because Justice Souter incorrectly relied on Burdine
dicta, the St. Mary's majority opinion contains the better reading of
Burdine. Moreover, the majority opinion is entirely consistent with
Burdine to the extent that Burdine is consistent with McDonnell
Douglas.
C. Aikens: The CorrectInterpretationBecomes Clear

That the St. Mary's majority was correct is further revealed by careful examination of United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens.214 The Aikens Court stated that the ultimate question in a Title
VII discrimination case is "discrimination vel non. ''215 After explain207. Id. at 256. The Court went on to explain that the plaintiff can meet this burden
by disproving the defendant's proffered explanation. Id. As previously noted, however,
in advancing this proposition, the Burdine Court cited McDonnell Douglas-yet
McDonnell Douglas "does not say, at the cited pages or elsewhere, that all the plaintiff
need do is disprove the employer's asserted reason." St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2753.
208. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2762 (Souter, J.,dissenting). Justice Scalia concluded
that "the dissent's interpretation causes many portions of the opinion to be incomprehensible or deceptive." St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2753.
209. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2759 (Souter, J.,dissenting). Justice Souter contended
that requiring the defendant to clearly frame the factual issues necessarily means that the
employer "choose[s] the scope of the factual issues to be resolved by the factfinder." Id.
(Souter, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
211. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
212. Id. at 255-56.
213. Id. at 256.
214. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
215. Id.at 714. Vel non literally means "or not." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1555
(6th ed. 1990). The Court explained ina footnote that the "trier of fact should consider
allthe evidence, giving itwhatever weight and credence itdeserves." Aikens, 460 U.S.
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ing that the factual inquiry becomes more specific after the defendant
proffers its reasons and the presumption of discrimination drops from
the case, the Aikens Court explained that the factfinder must ultimately
decide who to believe216 in determining whether
the defendant inten217
plaintiff.
the
against
discriminated
tionally
As Justice Scalia correctly observed, I8 in St. Mary's Justice Souter
improperly relied on the concurring opinions in Aikens rather than the
majority opinion. 21 9 Although the Aikens ruling was unanimous,
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, •wrote
a concurring
•
220
opinion and Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment only.
Justice Blackmun wrote to explain that in his view, the Court's opinion reaffirmed McDonnell Douglas and also made it clear that the
plaintiff necessarily prevails upon demonstrating that the defendant's
proffered reasons are false.22' Yet this view did not win a majority of
the Aikens Court. Instead, the Aikens majority held that for the plaintiff to prevail, the factfinder must determine that the 2adverse
action
22
resulted from discrimination prohibited under Title VII.
D. Rule 301: Legislative History Provides a
Basisfor the Court's Reasoning
The plain language of Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and its legislative history, mandate the ruling in St. Mary's. Rule 301
provides that the party against whom a presumption is raised assumes
a burden to produce evidence to meet or rebut the presumption.
Yet
that party does not also assume the burden of persuasion.
As the
Judiciary Conference Committee explained, if the party opposing the

at 714 n.3.
216. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716. Although the Aikens Court noted the difficulty in
ascertaining subjective intent, it recognized that nevertheless, factfinders must often do
so. Id.
217. Id. at 715 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253).
218. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2754.
219. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
220. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 717-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Ironically, Justices Blackmun and
Brennan cited the language previously analyzed in this Note in which the Burdine court
cited pages of McDonnell Douglas which do not support this proposition. See supra
notes 69 and 203.
222. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court, stating that the
factfinder must decide which party it believes in reaching its decision, remanded the case
to the district court to determine whether Aikens was the victim of unlawful discrimination. Id. at 716-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
223. FED. R. EvID. 301.
224. Id.
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presumption offers evidence contradicting the presumption, "the court
cannot instruct the jury that it may presume the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts. The court may, however,
instruct the jury that it may infer
the existence of the presumed fact
2
from proof of the basic facts." 1
What follows is that once a Title VII intentional employment
discrimination defendant proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action, the factfinder is not requiredto find the existence
of intentional discrimination (the presumed fact) based solely on the
prima facie case and disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons (the
basic facts). The factfinder is permitted, however, to infer the existence of intentional discrimination based solely on the prima facie case
and disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons. This inference, if
drawn, is sufficient to support a finding that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff. This is the precise holding of St.
Mary's. 226 In sum, the St. Mary's majority both correctly interpreted
existing precedent and properly followed the Federal Rule of Evidence
that governs presumptions in civil proceedings.
V. IMPACT

Although Justice Souter predicted that the Court's decision in St.
Mary's will lead to unfairness to Title VII plaintiffs,227 the only
"change" that St. Mary's will cause is that it can no longer be questioned that under the Title VII shifting burden framework, first set
forth in McDonnell Douglas, plaintiffs can prevail only if the factfinder
makes a specific finding of intentional discrimination. 228 This
"change" will likely favor plaintiffs rather than defendants.
Indeed, as lower federal courts have begun to apply St. Mary's,
Justice Souter's prediction of dire consequences has quickly proved
inaccurate. The Second Circuit has emphasized that contrary to Justice
Souter's warning, St. Mary's will not cause "[p]anic ... [to] break
out among the courts of appeals." 229 Rather, the Second Circuit concluded that St. Mary's reaffirms the long-standing rule that the ultimate
225. H.R. CONF. REP No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7099 (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Conference Committee).
226. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. Justice Scalia concluded that the "Court of
Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment
for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption
does not shift the burden of proof." Id.
227. Id. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting).
228. See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1993),
petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Jan. 3, 1994) (No. 93-1066).
229. Id. at 141-42 (alteration in original) (quoting St. Mary's 113 S. Ct. at 2750).
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burden of proof rests solely with the plaintiff.2 0
Although St. Mary's held that the plaintiff is not entitled to a finding
of intentional discrimination upon disproof of the defendant's proffered reasons, it still allows the factfinder to infer the ultimate fact of
intentional discrimination from the rejection of the defendant's justifications. Because the St. Mary's Court eradicated any confusion
surrounding the propriety of such inferences, plaintiffs may now be
more likely to win judgment as a matter of law upon disproof of the
23
defendant's reasons. This has already been the case in the First, '
Third,232 Fifth,233 and Eighth Circuits."
Raising another advantage for plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit has read
St. Mary's as making it more difficult for defendants to win at the
summary judgment or directed verdict stages.23 5 That court held that
"[ilf a plaintiff succeeds in raising a genuine factual issue regarding the
authenticity of the employer's stated motive, summary judgment is
inappropriate, because it is for the trier of fact to decide which story is

230. Id. at 142.
231. Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., Nos. 91-1591, 91-1614, 1993 WL 406515 (1st
Cir. Oct. 18, 1993). The Biggins court recognized that to prevail, the plaintiff must not
only show that the proffered reasons are false, but also that discrimination was the real
reason for the adverse employment action. Id. at *4. Nevertheless, citing the St. Mary's
holding that permits the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination from its rejection
of the defendant's proffered reasons, the Biggins court ruled that the "jury must have
found that Hazen Paper's explanation . . . was 'unworthy of credence."' Id. Prior to St.
Mary's, the First Circuit followed the pretext-plus approach. See supra note 89 and
accompanying text.
232. See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 329
n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting in dicta that "[s]howing pretext is not necessarily sufficient
to meet the plaintiffs burden of proof") (emphasis added).
233. See Moham v. Steego Corp., 3 F.3d 873, 876 (5th Cir. 1993). The Fifth Circuit
explained that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons is not, by itself, a finding of
discrimination. However, noting that the factfinder found that the defendant's testimony was "unconvincing" and that the plaintiff's testimony was "credible," the Fifth
Circuit held that the factfinder had made the requisite finding of intentional employment
discrimination. Id.
234. Maness v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 7 F.3d 704, 707 (8th Cir. 1993) (interpreting
St. Mary's as "holding that once an employer articulates a non-discriminatory purpose
for termination, the three-part analysis drops from the case, and the district court must
only decide whether the employer intentionally discriminated or retaliated against the
employee").
235. See Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993). In Hairston v.
Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921, (11th Cir. 1993), the court applied
St. Mary's to an appeal of a grant of summary judgment to a defendant in an age
discrimination case, stating that the "plaintiffs burden at summary judgment is met by
introducing evidence that could form the basis for a finding of facts, which . . . could
allow a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff has established
pretext."
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to be believed. 236
Finally, although Justice Souter feared that upon remand Hicks
would be given no opportunity to disprove the district court's hypothesized explanation for St. Mary's action-personal animosity by
Hicks's supervisor 23 7-that fear quickly proved unfounded. When St.
Mary's arrived again at the Eighth Circuit, 238 that court carefully noted
that the plaintiffs prima facie case, coupled with the factfinder's disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons, "will permit the factfinder
to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and . . . that,
upon such rejection, '[n]o additional proof of discrimination is
required.''" 239 The Eighth Circuit then remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether the defendants were actually motivated by
personal animosity or whether their animosity was racially
motivated. 24
VI. CONCLUSION
Contrary to Justice Souter's contentions, St. Mary's does not ignore
two decades of precedent. Nor does it make proving Title VII
employment discrimination cases more difficult for plaintiffs. Instead,
it merely clarifies the framework under which the plaintiff may prove
intentional discrimination. That framework, first advanced in
McDonnell Douglas, still consists of three basic stages: First, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, upon
which a rebuttable presumption arises that the defendant's actions were
discriminatory. Next, the defendant must rebut the prima facie case by
introducing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.
Finally, the plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination, either
directly or indirectly. At this final stage, St. Mary's requires the
factfinder to decide whom to believe. If the factfinder does not believe
that the defendant's proffered reasons were the actual reasons for the
236. Washington, 10 F.3d at 1433. The Court further explained:
Because, as St. Mary's recognizes, the factfinder in a Title VII case is entitled
to infer discrimination from plaintiffs proof of a prima facie case and showing
of pretext without anything more, there will always be a question for the
factfinder once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case and raises a genuine
issue as to whether the employer's explanation for its action is true. Such a
question cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
Id.
237. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2766 (Souter, J., dissenting).
238. Hicks III, 2 F.3d at 265.
239. Id. at 266-67 (quoting St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749) (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted in original).
240. Hicks III, 2 F.3d at 267.
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adverse employment action, the factfinder is permitted-but not compelled-to determine on that basis alone that unlawful discrimination
took place.
The key here, and the only real point of contention between the
majority and the dissent, is that the factfinder must make a specific
finding of proscribed discrimination. Disbelief of the defendant's reasons, absent this specific finding, is insufficient as a matter of law to
allow the plaintiff to prevail. Still, the St. Mary's decision leaves
much discretion to the factfinder in reaching the ultimate finding of
intentional employment discrimination. As a result, St. Mary's will
likely favor plaintiffs rather than defendants because courts of appeal
previously inclined to follow the pretext approach are still permitted to
do so provided the factfinder makes the requisite finding of intentional
discrimination upon disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons.
Perhaps more importantly, at least one federal court has read St.
Mary's as making it difficult for defendants to win at the summary
judgment or directed verdict stage, reasoning that once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case and raises a genuine issue of fact as to
the truth of the defendant's proffered reason, the factfinder-and not
the court-must resolve the ultimate question of whether the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. In short, contrary to
Justice Souter's fear that the Court's decision in St. Mary's will
greatly disadvantage Title VII plaintiffs, the Court's decision will most
likely disfavor Title VII defendants.
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